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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:

A

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE LEGAL POSITIONS IN
INDIA AND

SouTH

AFRICA

Dr. Avinash Govindjee and Dr. Sairam Bhat"
It is nowo a matterofroutine to includerestrictivecovenants in employment contracts.
Such clauses circumscribethe pernissiblerangeofactionsof theemployee to protect
the business concerns of the employer This articlecompares the judicialapproach
towards restrictivecovenants in India andSouth Africa. Throughsuchacomparison,
the authors attempt to highlightwhy it is significantto balancethe constitutional
imperative offreedom of tradeand profession with the sanctity of contract,without
privileging one over the other In light oflndia and South Africa's sharedsocial
experiences andcurrentlevels ofeconomicgrowth, the articleconcludes with suitable
changeswhich should be adoptedby the respectivejudiciaries,combining the existing
strengths of each system with lessons learntfrom the other.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Employers always want to retain efficient employees. This desire is more

pronounced in competitive industries where key employees are not only valuable to
their employer, but are also a potential threat to the business if they leave their
employment and begin working for a rival. In an age of greater employee mobility,
the increased ability of employees to take trade secrets and other confidential
information with them when they depart, has further fuelled these concerns.
In this atmosphere, employers are taking increased steps to protect themselves
against the prospect of opportunistic employees absconding with the customers of
the business and proprietary information. This is most often done by way of
incorporating restrictive covenants within the contract of employment Despite the
popularity of this device with employers, very little research has been conducted
regarding the appropriateness of the current legal approach being followed in India.'
Restrictive covenants, insofar as they restrict the future conduct of employees,
raise a number of issues regarding the freedom of contract and the right to work.
Such a right has constitutional shades, and in so far as it is based on the freedom of
contract, it can also be traced to common law. Ultimately the question is one of
balance - does the freedom of contract include the freedom to bind oneself to future
restrictions, or can certain substantive limitations be imposed to protect this freedom
itself?
This note seeks to examine this issue from a comparative perspective and
instigate debate by comparing the legal position governing restrictive covenants in
employment contracts in India and South Africa.

II.

REASONS FOR COMPARING INDIA WITH SOUTH AFRICA

One may at first glance question the merit in comparing the legal position
governing restrictive contractual clauses in India and South Africa. After all, India's
common law is exclusively based on English Law while South Africa's common law
is Roman-Dutch based. In addition, India has the benefit of the Indian Contract Act,

For some exceptions to this statement, see Jain, Would Restraint of Trade Survive Even
After Termination of Agreement?, IV C.L.C. 184 (2005) (hereinafter JAIN); Scetharaman &
Pai, Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 2 CoMp. L.J. 101 (2002) (hereinafter
SEETHARAMAN & PAI).

Until a few years ago, however, restraints of trade in South African contract law were
greatly influenced by English law. See Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v. Ellis,
1984 (4) SA 874, 876 & 877.
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1872, which overrides certain common law principles, whereas South Africa has no
legislation specifically devoted to the law of contract.
However, it is submitted that it is these differences and the dissimilarity in
approaches favoured by the two countries that make the comparison an interesting
one, and which, we hope, may result in renewed questioning as to the merits of each
approach?
Further, there are also some well-known similarities that make such a legal
comparison apposite. India and South Africa are countries which both still experience
great inequality and large-scale poverty. Laws, policies and judgments therefore
need to be attuned to the economic and social realities facing the people, while poor
implementation continues to be a practical problem that needs to be factored in
while framing such policies in the first place. Both countries also share similar
historical experiences. Based on all these factors and various other common interests,
both countries have formed a strong alliance at the international level and routinely
collaborate on a variety of issues.' More importantly, just as India's drafters viewed
a range of preceding Constitutions in drafting India's historical document, South
Africa's drafters learnt lessons from India in drafting the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996. Judges in South Africa have also been impressed by the
judgments of their Indian counterparts. As Sachs notes:
We look to the Indian Supreme Court which had a brilliant period of
judicial activism when a certain section of the Indian intelligentsia felt
let down by Parliament. They were demoralised by the failure of
Parliament to fulfil the promise of the Constitution, by the corruption
of government, by the authoritarian rule that was practiced so often at
that time. Some of the judges felt the Courts must do something to
rescue the promise of the Constitution, and through a very active and
ingenious interpretation bringing different clauses together they gave
millions of people the chance to feel 'we are people in our country, we
have constitutional rights, we can approach the Courts.. .

4

6

For an example of criticism of the current Indian legal position, see: SEETARAMAN & PAT,
supra note .
In Pathumma v. State of Kerala, A.LR. 1978 SC. 771, 779, the Court held that it was not
necessary for the Supreme Court to rely on the American Constitution for the purpose
of examining the seven freedoms contained (at that stage) in Article 19 of the Indian
Constitution precisely because the social conditions and habits of Indian people were
different. See also: Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.IR. 1973 S.C. 947, 952.
Mbeki, India and South Africa: The Ties that Bind, Tais DAY, Oct. 17, 2003, at 15.
Sachs, Making Rights Work -The South African Experience in Smi, MAILNG RGiS WORK 1,
10 (1999). See- Nageswara Rae, Human Rights Initiatives in NiRMAL, HuMAN RrGirrs IN IND
HisTouicAL, SOCIAL AND POLCAL PERSPECrIVEs 53, 68 (2000).
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The Preambles to the Indian and South African Constitutions are similar in
their championing of the ideals of "social justice" and the improvement of the quality
of life of all citizens? Directly relevant to the issue at hand is the similarity between
the constitutional protections for freedom of trade, occupation and profession in the
respective Constitutions. § 22 of the South African Constitution states that every
citizen has the right to choose his trade, occupation or profession freely and that the
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law. Similarly,
Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution grants all citizens the right to practise any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business while Article 19(6) deals
with permissible exceptions on the exercise of the right?
It is these constitutional freedoms that are directly implicated by upholding a
clause in a contract that restrains an employee in a certain tangible way and
circumscribes his freedom to work.

111. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH IN INDIA
Traditional restrictive covenants in employment agreements contain one or
more of the following provisions:
1.

Confidentiality agreements, in which the employee promises not to reveal
confidential or proprietary information acquired in the course of employment
after termination of that employment;9

2.

Non-competition agreements, in which the employee promises not to start a
competing business or work for a competitor for a given period after departing;0
and

3.

Non-solicitation agreements, in which the employee promises not to solicit the
employer's clients or employees for a given period after termination of the
employment.

The legality of such clauses is governed by § 27 of the Indian Contract Act,
which itself was wholly imported from Field's Draft Code for New York and was

Govindjee, The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social
Policy in South Africa: Lessons from India (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan University).
DATAR, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

174-5 (2001).

Bob Hepple, The Duty of Loyalty: Employee Loyalty in English Law, 20 Cow.
205, 215 (1999),

Tld
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based upon the old English doctrine of restraint of trade." § 27 states that every
agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade
or business of any kind, is to that extent void. As a result of this statutory rule,
Courts have historically expressed hostility to contractual provisions that limit
employee conduct after the employment relationship has terminated, and have
therefore regarded restrictive covenants with suspicion, often refusing to enforce
them. In general, judicial objections to enforcing restrictive covenants have
traditionally fallen into two categories: opposition to restraint of trade, and concern
over the need to protect employees. 2 More specifically, Courts have displayed hostility
to restrictive covenants because they regard them as (1) deprivations of employees'
ability to earn a living, (2) anti-competitive, (3) the result of unequal bargaining
power between employers and employees, and (4) contrary to general principles of
promoting free labour.
A priorigeneral or partial restraints contained in a service or business contract
have normally been held to be void by the Courts. For instance, in Brahmaputra Tea
Co. v. Scarth," a stipulation in a contract prohibiting the defendants from engaging
in the cultivation of tea for a period of five years from the date of the termination of
the agreement was held to be void. This was despite the fact that the restriction was
limited only to a distance of forty miles from the plaintiff's tea gardens. In line with
the above, the Courts have also shown reluctance in enforcing non-disclosure clauses.
In Shree Gopal Paper Mills v. SKG Malhotra 4 for example, the Supreme Court held
against enforcing such a clause. In this case, the defendants had signed an employment
contract, Cl. 2(c) of which read as follows: "Employee or managing agents... shall not
divulge nor communicate to any person or persons whatsoever any information which he may
receive or obtain in relation to the affairs of the Company". The defendant had worked as an
apprentice for one year and left the company. The Company sought an injunction
against the defendant, which was denied by the Court. The Court concluded that no
"special training" was imparted to the defendants and there was no opportunity to
acquire any information that may be qualified as a trade secret or as information
that required any protection. Therefore, the clauses in the contract were held to be
non-enforceable.'5
& P Al, supra note 1.
Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68.
" [1885] I.L.R. 11 Cal 545 [Calcutta High Court].
SEThiARA.MAN
S

2

'4

15

Al1.R. 1960 S.C. 61.
See also V.N. Deshpande v. Arvind Mills, A.LR. 1964 Born 423 [Bombay High Court]. In the
said case, the High Court of Bombay was considering a clause relating to confidentiality
of information and stated as follows:
Clause 9 of the agreement prevents the appellant from divulging any secret
information of the nature mentioned in that clause after the termination of his
service. As pointed out in Herbert Morris Ltd. V. Saxelby, [1916] 1 AC 688 [HL]
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This case was followed by the landmark decision in Niranjan Shanker Golikari
v. The Century Spinning Company.'" Century Spinning Company entered into a
technology transfer agreement with a German company. The company also entered
into an agreement with its foreign collaborators for maintaining such information
as confidential. Pursuant to this agreement, they entered into non-disclose agreements
with their employees. This present dispute arose when an employee with whom a
contract of employment was signed for a period of five years, received training for 9
months and then left the company to join a rival concern. Clause 9 of the employment

contract read as follows: "Employer shall have the right to restrainan employeefrom divulging
any andall information,instruments, documents, reportsetc. which may havecome to his knowledge
while in service of the company." In this case, the Court drew a clear distinction between
special information and general knowledge and found that since general knowledge
was the asset of the employee, no injunction could be granted. In the same breath,
however, it also recognised that restraints that operate during the period of
employment will "generally" not be regarded as in restraint of trade. This balancing
act in this case makes it one of the most important decisions on the doctrine of
restraint of trade as applicable to employment contracts in India.
In so far as the onus of proof in such cases is concerned, in a controversial
judgment, the Gujarat High Court in Sandhya Organic Chemicals v. United
Phosphorus Ltd.17 held that the onus of proof shall lie on the party who claims the
violation of an agreement. In this case, Sandhya Chemicals had invented a new
process of manufacturing aluminium and zinc phosphides and claimed that one of
its employees who had known trade secrets had leaked certain information to United
Phosphorus and helped them start selling a similar product using the same process.
Sandhya Chemicals brought a suit of injunction against United Phosphorus in an
attempt to interdict them from making use of the trade secrets that had been disclosed.
The Court held that unless Sandhya Chemicals could prove patentability of its
product, United Phosphorus was permitted to bring out similar products and would
incur no liability whatsoever towards Sandhya Chemicals for making use of trade
secrets received from an ex-employee of Sandhya Chemicals. This case shows how
difficult it would be for any company to actually prove the violation of non-disclosure
agreements post-employment.

the defendant is not prevented from acquiring knowledge which makes him a

16
17

better employee for the public for future employment. It only prevents him
from divulging information which he has received as respondents' employee
to another party. It is, therefore, clear that the clause as worded is proper and
an injunction granted in terms thereof is not unreasonable or wider latitude
than justified in law.
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1098.
AIR 1997 Guj 177 [Gujarat High Court].
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As a result of such cases, Indian lawyers have traditionally frowned upon the
very idea of signing non-compete clauses with employees on the ground that this is
judicially indefensible. The position in India appears to be that employers are not
entitled to protect themselves against competition per se on the part of an employee
after the employment has ceased." In other words, a bare covenant not to compete
cannot be upheld." However, there have been decisions that reveal a backtracking
from this strict approach.

IV. RETHINKING

THE STRICT APPROACH?

The traditionally strict attitude of the judiciary has slowly started to shift. It
must be remembered that § 27 of the Indian Contract Act was enacted at a time
when trade was still undeveloped and the object underlying the section was to
protect trade from any restraints. Today, however, trade in India has developed to a
larger extent, and some have argued that there is no reason why a more liberal
attitude should not be adopted by allowing such restraints as are deemed reasonable
on the facts and circumstances of each case. 0 For example, Seetharaman and Pai
submit that in certain cases non-compete and non-disclose agreements should in
fact be upheld as being in the public interest.9 ' Similarly, Jain argues that there
should be some exceptions to the rule that every agreement in restraint of trade after
its termination is void? He contends that the Courts ought to provide flexibility to
the rule depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.23 Even the
Allahabad High Court in Bholanath Shankar Dar v. Lachmi Narain2 has observed,
"it is unfortunate thatsec. 27... seriously trenches upon the libertyof the individualin contractual
mattersaffecting trade."
In an employment contract, it has been submitted that the employer may
protect two interests: trade secrets and business connections? In Niranjan Shanker
Golikari v. The Century Spinning Company 6 the Court held by obiter that "any restraint
of tradefor the protection of trade secrets is reasonable,ifrestrictedto time, nature ofemployment
HAY, HALSBURY'S LAws or INDIA Vol. 47, 127 (2002).
" Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd. v. Vancouver Breweries Ltd., A.I.R. 1934 P.C.
101 [Privy Council].
2
POLLOCK & MULLA; INDIAN CoNTmCT AND SrPEcIc RELIEF Acts VOL. 1813 (Bhadbahde ed., 2006).
2 SEETHARAMAN & PAJ, supranote 1, at 104.
1

"

JAIN,

supra note 1.

23 Id.
24

A.I.R. 1931 All. 83 [Allahabad High Court.

2

Easthan v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd., [1963] 3 All E.R. 139 [Chancery Division].
'

Supra note 16.
52
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andarea." A restraint is also valid if it protects a "legitimate" interest of the employer
and the nature of such interests recognised as legitimate by law will vary according
to the subject matter of the contract. However, as discussed above, these comments
should not be construed to mean that the law will allow a covenant merely to avoid
competition.17 Even in cases where the employer has trained the employee or enabled
the employee to become a skilled craftsman or professional worker, the employer
cannot demand that these skills should not be used against him."
Nevertheless, perceptions about clauses in restraint of trade have changed
further with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling v. Coca Cola Co.29
In this case Coca Cola had licensed Gujarat Bottling to bottle and sell aerated
beverages subject to the latter not manufacturing, selling, dealing or otherwise
associating with competing products. When Gujarat Bottling breached the covenant,
the matter went up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that:
A negative covenant that the employee would not engage himself in a
trade or business or would not get himself employed by any other
master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar
duties, is not therefore a restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid
is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided...
The Court then went on to hold that "any non-disclosure clause shall be applicable
only during the periodofservice and any restraintbeyond the service is in violation ofsection 27
Indian Contract Act 1872."1o Thus, the Court recognised that a standard of
reasonableness should be applied when judging any clause as being in restraint of
trade (although the Court chose not to decide on this issue). Also, a distinction was
recognised between restrictions operating during the period of employment and
those operating post-employment.
This line of argument has led the Courts to conclude that an agreement of
service by which an employee binds himself not to compete with his employer,
directly or indirectly, during the term of his agreement is not considered to be in
restraint of trade. In Makhanlal Natta v. Tridib Ghosh,' a stage artist had agreed
with a drama company not to join another drama company. The clause was found to
be reasonable considering that the remuneration given to the defendant by the
plaintiff was much more than that offered by the other company, and that injury to
27

Premji Damodar v. Firm LV Govindji and Co., A.LR. 1943 Sind 197 [Sind High Court].

29

Supra note 20, at 825.

29

AIR, 1995 S.C. 2372.

'Id

SA.IR. 1993 Cal 289 [Calcutta High Court].
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the plaintiff was irreparable. The artist was accordingly restrained from joining
another company till the period of the contract. Similarly, a negative covenant in a
contract of service signed by an assistant engineer who agreed not to leave the
service of his employer during the term of the contract, and not to serve or engage for
any other firm in India or elsewhere during that period, was not considered to be in
restraint of trade."
Finally, in this regard, a wrongful dismissal of an employee, being an entire
repudiation of the contract, puts an end to an ancillary agreement like the covenant
in restraint of trade. This was reiterated by the Court in Superintendence Company
v. Krishna Murgai," where the employment contract clause read as follows: "Employee
herebyagrees not to take employment in a competitorfirm or set up a similarbusinesshimselfafter
he leaves the service of the employer." The defendant's services were terminated and he
subsequently established a competing business which resulted in the company
seeking an injunction against his actions. The Court interpreted the term 'leave' to
mean voluntary departure and not termination. Importantly, the Court held that a
wide interpretation of the term 'leave', to include termination of contract, would
violate § 27 of the Indian Contract Act.
Another way in which the strict approach is being departed from is through
recognising implied terms into the contract of employment. For instance, in every
employment contract, a term that the employee will give faithful service to the
employer is regarded as an implied term, and certain activities of employees are
regarded as breaches of that duty to faithful serviceN In Industrial Development
Consultants v. Cooley' a major common law case and hence relevant to India the
defendant was a reputed architect employed with IDC. The Eastern Gas Board
Company was offering a lucrative contract for building 4 depots and IDC was keen
to bid for the same. As Cooley was keen to get the contract on his own, he resigned
from IDC claiming a nervous breakdown and bid for the Eastern Gas Board contract.
After the contract was given to Cooley, IDC filed a suit against him for breach of duty.
The Court held that there was a breach of the implied duty of fidelity and that
Cooley should account for the profit he had made from the deal. This judgment was
based upon the realisation that Cooley could not have bid for the contract without

a Lalbhavi Dalpatbhai and Co v. Chittarangan Chandulal Pandiya, A.R. 1966 Guj 189
IGujarat High Court].
A.LR. 1980 S.C. 1717.
In Robb v. Green, [18951 2 Q.B. 315 [Queen's Bench Division), it was held that an employee

who copies out names and addresses of his employer's customers for personal use
after leaving employment has breached the duty of fidelity and can be prevented from
using the lists.
15 [1972] 2 All E.R. 162.
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all the material information he had acquired during the nature and course of his
employment with IDC.

V. ONUS

AND REMEDIES

The Supreme Court in the Niranjan Shanker Golikari's case, was of the opinion

that where an agreement is challenged on the ground of it being in restraintof trade,
the onus is upon the party supporting the contract to show that the restraint is
reasonably necessary to protect his interests. Thus, it can be inferred that restrictive
covenants are not per se in violation of

§ 27 but that they would be invalid if the

employer fails to prove that they are reasonable. However, in the Gujarat Bottling
case 3' the Court refused to consider the question whether reasonableness of restraint
is within the purview of § 27 of the Contract Act and proceeded on the basis that an
enquiry into reasonableness of the restraint is not envisaged by § 27. As a result of
this view, they held that instead of being required to consider two questions as in
England, the Courts in India have only to consider the question whether the contract
is or is not in restraint of trade.
In Sunilchand C. Mazumdar v. Aryodaya Spinning and Weaving Mills Co.
Ltd., the defendant, a qualified technician and diploma holder in textile technology,
agreed to serve the plaintiff's spinning mills for five years. After serving for about a
year as a senior assistant he resigned and accepted an employment in another
spinning company on a salary higher than before. He was employed by the plaintiff
because of his specialised training and admittedly there was a considerable dearth
of such trained technicians. This agreement was held to be valid and an injunction to
prevent breach of negative covenant was granted. It was held that the onus of
justifying the covenant in restraint of trade or of proving reasonableness lies upon
the covenantee But once this onus is discharged, the onus of proving that the
restraint tends to injure the public lies upon the party attacking the covenant.4o

However, as mentioned earlier, the case of Sandhya Organic Chemicals v. United
Phosphorus Ltd stands as a reminder that this position of law is not as clear cut as
it appears on the face of it.

36

Supra note 16.

11

Supra note 29.

as A.l.R. 1964 Guj 115 [Gujarat High Court].

so

AI R. 1980 Raj 155 [Rajasthan High Court].
Supra note 16.

* Supra note 17.
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From the aforesaid analysis it emerges that the Indian position on restrictive
covenants is shrouded in ambiguity. While initially a strict approach was favoured,
today much water has flown under the bridge to conclude that the self-same
strictness persists as the position of law. The interests of business and increased
mobility of employees has led the courts to rethink their original formulations. It can
only be hoped that the result of this rethink soon crystallise into a clear and
unambiguous position of law.

VI.

THE

SouTH

AFRICAN LAW PosITION

A. Background and Onus:MagnaAlloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v. Ellis"'
In Magna Alloys, the Appellate Division found that previous South African
judgments, which had held that a covenant in restraint of trade was primafacie invalid
or unenforceable, stemmed from English law and not South African common law
According to the Court, the common law in South Africa contained no rule to that
effect, and, the proper position was that each agreement should be examined with
regard to its own circumstances in order to ascertain whether the enforcement of
the agreement would be contrary to public policy, in which event it would be
unenforceable. The Court held that while public policy required that agreements
freely entered into should be honoured, it also generally required that everyone
should be free to seek fulfillment in the business and professional world. An
unreasonable restriction of a person's freedom of trade would, therefore, probably
also be contrary to public policy if enforced. Importantly, the Court decided that
when a party alleged that he or she was not bound by a restrictive condition to
which he or she had agreed, the onus would be on that person to prove that the
enforcement of the condition would be contrary to public policy.'
The Magna Alloys case was heard prior to the operation of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and some judges have begun to argue that the
manner in which onus was dealt with in that case is now unconstitutional. In the
recent decision of Canon KwaZulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd. v. Booth," a provincial division
of the High Court held that because a restraint of trade constituted a limitation on a
person's constitutional right to earn a living, the restraining party should establish
that the restraint was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. Similarly, in Lifeguards

42
4

4

Supra note 2.
For a review of the literature prior and post the Magna Alloys case, see Kerr, Restraint of
Trade afterMagnaAlloys inVissER, EssAYs iN HoNoueo ELusoN KA-iN 186 (1989).
2005 (3) S.A. 205 (N).
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Africa (Ply) Ltd. v. Raubenheimer," the Court raised the question as to whether it
was contrary to the spirit, object and purport of the Constitution to burden the
covenantor (employee) in a covenant in restraint of trade with the onus of proving
that a limitation to his or her constitutional right to freedom of trade, occupation
and profession was not reasonable and justifiable."
B. UnreasonableRestraintsContrary to Public Policy

Although it may be argued that Courts view restraints between employers
and employees more strictly because it is assumed that parties are not in an equal
bargaining position, in Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd. v. Richter and others, 4' the Court
confirmed that covenants in restraint of trade are valid in South Africa. Like all
other contractual stipulations, however, they are unenforceable to the extent that
their enforcement would contravene public policy.48 The Court stated the following
in this regard:
It is against public policy to enforce a covenant which is unreasonable,
one which unreasonably restricts the covenantor's freedom to trade or
to work. In so far as it has that effect, the covenant will not therefore be
enforced. Whether it is indeed unreasonable must be determined with
reference to the circumstances of the case. Such circumstances are not
limited to those that existed when the parties entered into the covenant.
Account must also be taken of what has happened since then and, in
particular,of the situation prevailing at the time enforcementis sought.49
A restraint that is found to be reasonably required for the protection of the
party who seeks to enforce it, in accordance with the test that has been laid down in
the cases, is constitutionally permitted." To determine the reasonableness of a
restraint, a Court in South Africa must make a value judgment with two principal
policy considerations in mind.1 The first is that the public interest requires that
parties should comply with their contractual obligations, as expressed by the maxim
favouring the sanctity of contract (pactasunt servanda).5 The second is that all persons
I 2006 (5) S.A. 364 (D).
46 § 36 of the Constitution states that rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited by a law of
general application if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
4
1987 (2) S.A. 237 (N).
"

Id.

5o

Reddy v. Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd., [2006] SCA 164 [RSA].

51

Iid, at 1115.
Visser, The PrincipleFacta ServandaSant in Roman and Roman-DutchLaw, with Specific Reference
to Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 101 S A.L-J 641 (1984).
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should be productive and be permitted to engage in trade and commerce or the
professions in the interests of society.5 3 It is important that both of these
considerations have been held to reflect constitutional values as well as the common
lawN
In other words, because of the concept of "public interest" a restraint would
be unenforceable if it prevents a party, after termination of his or her employment,
from partaking in trade or commerce without a corresponding interest of the other
party deserving of protection. In Basson v. Chilwan and others," four factors were
identified as being relevant in considering the reasonableness of a restraint
a)

Does one party have an interest that deserves protection after termination of
the agreement?

b)

If so, is that interest threatened by the other party?

c)

In that case, does such interest weigh qualitatively and quantitatively against
the interest of the other party not to be economically inactive and unproductive?

d)

Is there an aspect of public policy having nothing to do with the relationship
between the parties that requires that the restraint be maintained or rejected?

Other factors that will be taken into account and which form parts of the
inquiry include the nature, extent and duration of the restraint. In other words,
where the interest of the party sought to be restrained weighs more than the interest
to be protected, the restraint is unreasonable and unenforceable 7 For example, in
Basson v Chilwan 8 an employer's application to assert a protectable interest in
respect of customer connections against an ex-employee who had no such connections
was dismissed." By contrast, in Reddy v. Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd.A
the applicant was in possession of confidential information in respect of which the
115.
SS'upra note 50. Contractual autonomy was held to be part of the freedom informing the
constitutional value of dignity whereas freedom of contract was considered integral to
the constitutional right in § 22, described above.
" Townsend Productions (Pty) Ltd v. Leech and others, 2001 (4) SA 33 (C), 50J-51B.
1993 (3) SA 742 (A), 767G-H.
" Supra note 50, at 116.
" Supra note 50, at

5 Supra note 56.
For an example of technological innovation which was held not to constitute a "protectable
interest", see: Valunet Solutions Inc t/a Dinkum USA v. cTel Conmunications Solutions
(Pty) Ltd., 2005 (3) SA 494 (W).
6

Supra note 15, at 120.
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risk of disclosure by his employment with a competitor was found to be significant.
The respondent in this case merely sought to restrain the applicant from being
employed by a competitor for a period of twelve months and had no intention of
preventing the applicant from using any other personal skills and abilities.
Where the employee has had access to protectable information confidential to
his or her previous employer and the reasonable possibility exists, objectively
speaking, that the employee might disclose trade secrets to a new employer, the
Court's decision will not turn on whether the employee admits remembering any
relevant information. 61 In each case, the Court will look to the facts and will also not
be influenced by any undertakings made by an ex-employee to the effect that he or
she will not disclose the trade secrets.6 After employment has ceased, an employer
is not entitled to protection against a former employee's competition per se by a
covenant taken from the employee during or prior to employment.63

C. Protectionin the Absence of a Restraintof Trade Clauseand PartialEnforcement
It appears to be clear that a contract of employment will be breached by an
employee who misuses trade secrets, knowledge of secret processes or business
connections - irrespective of the existence of a restrictive covenant.M In this case the
employer would appear to be entitled to use the remedies of an interdict (injunction)
to prevent an ex-employee from using his or her inside knowledge to unlawfully
compete."' A claim for damages should also be possible in such a case.
A proposed restraint should not be wider than necessary to protect the
protectable interest.66 In Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd. v. Frohling and others,7 the
Court held that an agreement in restraint of trade may be only partially enforced
when this was required by the public interest. In deciding this question, regard
could be had to whether the restraint clause was designed to be unduly oppressive
and whether partial enforcement would not operate harshly or unfairly towards
the person(s) bound by the restraint.'
*1 International Executive Communications Ltd t/a Institute for International Research v.
Turnley, 1996 (3) SA 1043 (W).
62
63

6

65

Id.

Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v. Viljoen and another, 1978 (3) SA 191 (W).
This is also possible as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty, see: Phillips v. Fieldstone
Africa (Pty) Ltd. and another, 2004 (3) SA 465 (SCA).
See: Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd and another v. Injectaseal CC and others, 1988 (2)

SA 54 (T).
" Nampesca (SA) Products (Pty) Ltd. v. Zaderer, 1999 (1) SA 886 (C), 894-895.
67

1990 (4) SA 782 (A).

68

Id.
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QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS?

The case law analysis conducted above illustrates a number of similarities
and some interesting differences in the Indian and South African approaches to
restrictive covenants in the employment context.
Irrespective of the legislative and common law differences in the treatment of
the subject, both countries appear to generally permit employees to compete with
their previous employers, whether or not a restrictive covenant was entered into,
after such employment has terminated. On the other hand, both countries generally
protect employers from an employee's disclosure of a legitimate trade secret and
against an abuse of business connections - possibly even in circumstances where no
such protection clauses were included in the employment contract. The remedies
the Courts will offer to employers in such cases of abuse also appear to be generally
the same.
The major differences in approach between the countries are equally clear.
South African Courts have consistently favored the view that public policy generally
requires the sanctity of contracts to be upheld and enforced over the constitutional
right to choose one's trade, occupation or profession freely. 9 Even subsequent to the
introduction of the Constitution, which included a section expressly protecting a
citizen's right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely, this principle
has been considered to be consistent with the constitutional values of dignity and
autonomy and is generally acceptable, By contrast (in particular because of the
provisions of the Indian Contract Act) courts in India have been more hesitant in
allowing companies to restrict the freedom of their employees once such employment
comes to an end.
It is submitted that both countries may be able to take a lesson or two from
each other. South Africa should depart from the Magna Alloys case and follow the
Indian approach of placing the onus on a company to show that a restrictive covenant
is necessary and reasonable. This is because of the primacy of the Constitutions of
both countries and because both Constitutions contain provisions which directly
protect a person's freedom to engage in a trade, occupation or profession of choice with no corresponding constitutional right protecting employers. A restriction of
such a constitutional right should be justified by the person responsible for seeking
such a restriction. In the Indian context, it may be arguable that the approach of
using § 27 of the Contract Act to prevent a restrictive covenant from operating is too
simplistic in the current economic environment and that a judicial enquiry similar
69

Supra note 50, at

121.

7o Id
6o
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to that conducted in recent South African decisions is more appropriate-" In other
words, it is arguable that there should be cases where an employer is entitled to
protection against an employee, even once the employment relationship has
terminated, in the interest of economic development and greater flexibility of
approach. This would necessitate a Court's enquiry into the reasonableness of such
clauses and not simply holding them to be invalid perse- despite the wording of § 27
of the Contract Act7
Whether or not non-compete clauses and non-disclosure agreements in India are
reasonable or not may be answered by the following test:
1.

the restraint should be no greater than is necessary to protect a legitimate
business interests, such as a trade secret;

2.

the restraint should not be unduly harsh or oppressive in restricting the
employee's ability to earn a living;

3.

the restraint should not otherwise be against public policy; and

4.

the restraint should be limited in accordance with the Time-Space-Locality
Rule.

It is submitted that a case-by-case analysis incorporating and balancing such
factors from a constitutional perspective will best serve both employers and
employees in India and South Africa. Whereas South African Courts should adjust
their approach in order to place greater emphasis on the constitutional rights of
employees (who are seldom able to enter into employment contracts on an equal
footing to companies), Indian Courts may continue to give greater prominence to the
validity of a restrictive covenant, freely entered into by an employee with some
economic muscle, in order to further protect the interests of business.

SJArN,

n

supra note 1, at 187.
& PAI, supra note 1, at 106.
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